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ABSTRACT
Modern large-scale industrial systems require special precautions for safe operation and 
systematic risk analysis is frequently used during system design. The paper reviews a 
number of problems presently found in the use of risk analysis as a basis for effective risk 
management. There is a need for more explicit formulation of the preconditions of safe 
operation and for better communication to the operating organization. Operation in a 
competitive environment requires endless adaptation and optimization by management 
and, consequently, visible indicators of the boundaries of safe conditions are necessary. 
The paper adopts an integrated system point of view in order to identify cross-disciplinary 
issues involving social and management sciences as well as engineering.
INTRODUCTION
The technological development during the recent decades has focused the public attention 
on the safety of industrial installations. At the same time, changing technology makes it 
necessary to find new means for control of safety in large-scale industrial systems. This is 
the case, not only for protection of people and environment, but also for the security of 
financial investments.
There is a general trend toward large-scale systems, not only for industrial production 
units, aerospace systems, and air traffic control, but also for consumer goods distribution 
systems, information systems, and systems for financial operations. This trend causes a 
large potential for loss and damage in case of technical faults in equipment and of human 
errors made during operation and maintenance. It is, therefore, no longer acceptable that 
single component failures or human errors can release a chain of events leading to acci-
dents and losses and a design philosophy  of'defence-in-depth' has evolved.
This philosophy implies that systems have numerous lines of defence such as protective 
functions, barriers against fault propagation, etc., which can serve to terminate accidental 
chains of events before serious loss and damage can occur. In addition, stand-by equip-
ment is installed and is supposed to take over when operating systems fail. A disturbance, 
e.g., a fault or human error, can then only evolve into an accident when it coincides with 
the presence of other faults that make the safety measures inactive. The philosophy in this 
way implies that a very low probability of major losses can be obtained if faults are 
causally independent, even when the frequency of errors and faults individually is high 
enough to be known empirically. 
This development has been very visible to the public, in particular with respect to the 
safety of large-scale industrial process plant such as nuclear power plants and chemical 
plants. For sake of clarity, the discussion in the following sections will focus on the 
safety problems of such installations because the formal methods of analysis are particu-
larly well developed for this application. It is possible, however, to generalize also to 
other application areas, and recently events, such as the stock market plunge during Octo-
ber 87, illustrate that other system-related safety problems call for closer analysis. This 
aspect will be briefly discussed in a subsequent section.
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CONTROL OF INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
The trend towards large-scale industrial process plants and the related defence-in-depth 
design practice have immediately two important implications. One is that the actual level 
of safety cannot be directly controlled from empirical evidence. For hazardous large scale 
installations, design cannot be based on experience gained from accidents, as it has been 
the case for accidents in minor separate systems when, for instance, considering work 
and traffic safety. The days of extensive pilot plant tests for demonstration of the feasibil-
ity of a design is over and safety target has to be assessed by analytical means based on 
empirical data from incidents and near misses, i.e., data on individual, simple faults and 
errors. Consequently, for industrial process plants, large efforts have been spent on de-
veloping methods for probabilistic risk analysis. 
Another consequence is the fallacy of the defence-in-depth practice unless special man-
agement precautions are taken. Exactly because of the  application of this design practice, 
systems will not respond actively to the individual faults and errors and recovery from la-
tent failed states calls for a special care by the operations management. 
Technological Risk Analysis
In a probabilistic risk analysis, a model of the plant and its function is used to predict the 
propagation through the system of the combined effects of different simultaneous faults 
and errors. For the unacceptable chains of events leading to accidents, the probability is 
estimated from empirical data collected for the individual errors and faults.
Typically, however, such risk analysis is considered only for the initial acceptance of a 
particular plant design. It is generally not fully realized that a risk analysis is only a theo-
retical construct relating a plant model and a number of assumptions concerning its opera-
tion and maintenance to a risk figure. This fact implies that after acceptance of a plant on 
the basis of the calculated risk, the model and assumptions underlying the risk analysis 
should be considered to be specifications of the preconditions for safe operation which, in 
turn, should be carefully monitored by the operating organization through the entire plant 
life (Rasmussen and Pedersen, 1984). 
This use of a risk analysis raises some important problems: Risk analysis and, in particu-
lar, the underlying hazard identification are, at present, an art rather than a systematic sci-
ence. We have stringent, systematic methods for analyzing specific accidental courses of 
events. However, identification of the hazards to analyze, in particular related to the 
influence of human activities during operation, maintenance and plants management, toa 
large extent depends upon the experience and creativity of the analyst. It is, therefore, 
difficult to make explicit the strategy used for hazard identification, the model of the sys-
tem and its operating staff used for analysis, and the assumptions made regarding its op-
erating conditions. In addition, the documentation of a risk analysis today is not designed 
for use during operations and maintenance planning and is not accessible for practical op-
erations management. 
The Fallacy of the Defence in Depth Philosophy 
Another important implication of the very nature of the 'defence in depth' design philoso-
phy is that the system very often does not respond actively to single faults. Conse-
quently, many errors and faults made by the staff and maintenance personnel do not di-
rectly reveal themselves by functional response from the system. Humans can operate 
with an extremely high level of reliability in a dynamic environment when slips and mis-
takes have immediately visible effects and can be corrected. Survival when driving 
through Paris during rush hours depends on this fact.
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Compare this to working in a system designed according to the defence in depth principle, 
where several independent events have to coincide before the systems responds by visible 
changes in behavior. Violation of safety preconditions during work on the system prob-
ably will not result in immediate functional response, and latent effects of erroneous acts 
can therefore be left in the system. When such errors are allowed to be present in a system 
over longer period of time, the probability of coincidence of the multiple faults necessary 
for release of an accident is drastically increased. Analyses of major accidents frequently 
show that the basic safety of the systems has eroded due to latent errors. A more signifi-
cant contribution to safety can be expected from efforts to decrease the duration of latent 
errors, than from measures to decrease their basic frequency. 
Recovery from latent errors in a system designed according to the defence-in-depth prin-
ciple, however, requires special management s ructures and functions. It is necessary to 
maintain a reliable, empirical control of the possible existence of latent violations of safety 
preconditions as specified by a risk analysis. Present organization and management forms 
in industry probably still reflect a tradition which has evolved through a period when 
safety could be controlled directly and empirically. The new requirements for safety con-
trol based on risk analyses have not yet had the necessary influence on the predominant 
organizational philosophy. 
Learning and Adaptation by Individuals and Organizations 
The problem of violation of the preconditions for safe operation is increased by the fact 
that both individuals and organizations continuously are striving to optimize performance 
in terms of functionality, effort, and economic pay-off. At the individual level, develop-
ment of skill and know-how depends on experiments and opportunity for changes in 
work procedures. At the organizational level, survival in a competitive nvironment pre-
supposes optimization of operation, rationalization of work procedures, and modification 
of production process and equipment. This optimization will be guided by more or less 
directly observable vidence.
In contrast, he limits of acceptable optimization as they are defined by the preconditions 
for safe operation, as mentioned, are not directly visible when a system is based on the 
defence-in-depth rinciple. Correspondingly, analyses of industrial ccidents ypically in-
dicate that pressure from functional or economic adaptation leads to a gradual erosion of 
the individual redundant safety preconditions until the time comes when violation of just 
one more precondition or a single component fault will release an accident. (Perrow, 
1986, Rasmussen, 1987).
In the efforts to optimize operational reliability, it is frequently argued that high plant 
availability and smooth production are good indicators of plant safety (Atomic Industrial 
Forum, 1986): "It is an indirect index of safety, because poor availability is essentially 
related with defective quipment, operations, or regulation, and it has direct impact on 
economics." It is, however, anecessary but not sufficient condition for safety, and  pro-
grams to increase availability should include explicit efforts to create also 'sufficient' 
safety indices. 
This tendency of an organization tooptimize and only to take into account the immediately 
visible empirical evidence can explain why accidents still can happen in spite of the large 
efforts to develop guidelines for risk management (see for instance Smith, 1987 and 
Cramer, 1987). Programs and organizations for risk management separate from the oper-
ational ine functions will have no visible results, if they are successful, and will be the 
first victims of the organizations adaptation toeconomic pressures. The only realistic so-
lution to this problem can very well be to introduce visible indicators of the performance 
of the risk management efforts. This will require that he current margin to the boundaries 
of the accepted risk level is made visible to decision makers. In addition, it should be 
considered that operation based on visible limits to the boundaries ofaccepted safety can
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have a positive influence on operations economy compared to 'blind' operation based on 
static and over-cautious safety factors. 
In conclusion, operation of large scale plants is subject o optimizing, exploring behavior 
of individuals and organizations. Recent research, furthermore, indicates clearly that the 
organic interaction among members of an organization leading to high reliability depends 
on adaptive self-organization (LaPorte  et al. 1987). Therefore, organizational learning and 
adaptation and the implied modification of procedures neither can, nor should be avoided 
and safety will depend on measures to support recovery from errors rather than on mea-
sures to decrease their frequency. Therefore, it is mandatory to make the limits of accept-
able changes clearly visible at all levels in the organization.
The strive of organizations to optimize performance will depend on subjective values in 
addition to the economic and functional criteria. Analysis of the criteria which are in prac-
tise controlling adaptation and optimization is important. In addition the dependence of 
such criteria upon cultural differences will be important for generalization. It is important 
to realize that it is not only a question of more or less developed countries, but a general 
question of differences between regions and countries also in the technologically most 
developed part of the world. Implicit in the design of highly structured systems uch as 
process plants is a number of assumptions about work allocation and training which can 
differ even among technically sophisticated countries. 
Communicating Design Basis to Operations Staff 
The conclusion of this discussion is that improvement of the safety of large scale indus-
trial operations depends on more efficient means for transfer of information from plant 
design and risk analysis to the operating organization. It should be seriously considered, 
however, that operations management cannot read the safety report every time a decision 
is made. Consequently, we need decision support systems based on information from 
plant design and risk analysis which are able to alert decision makers when safety 
preconditions are violated and to supply a safety 'index' indicating the current level of 
safety. 
In this context, the present development of general management and planning tools based 
on modern information technology is important. Tools are being developed for planning 
and book-keeping purposes within plant operation, staffing, and maintenance. Computer 
aided tools are introduced for design of plants and control systems, and methods for au-
tomated, computer-based risk analysis are emerging (Fussell, 1987, Amendola, 1984). A 
full-scale, probabilistic risk analysis for a specific plant is a very expensive project and the 
development of safety control tools should be considered also for plants for which a de-
tailed risk analysis is not available. The design practice which have evolved for chemical 
installations results in a rather uniform, generic structure of plants within the same pro-
cess category. Consequently, the first step in the direction of a systematic use of risk 
analysis in plant operation and audit could be the use of a prototypical 'default' risk 
analysis covering the basic features of a category of process plants. Such prototypical risk 
analyses could then be the adapted to the peculiarities of a particular plant with a reason-
able effort.
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
The discussion so far has been focused on the control of safety during normal operation 
and use of systems. One important conclusion has been that control of safety is an im-
portant task of the operating organization itself, not a task for a separate safety organiza-
tion. The tasks of the different levels have different time horizons. While the lower levels 
including the operating staff is involved in direct 'on-line control' of a dynamical system, 
the higher levels of management are typically involved in planning tasks of longer time 
frames. Another conclusion has been the need for better communication between design
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and risk analysis and the operation management. Similar conclusions can be drawn with 
respect to the emergency management which is required when an accident has occurred.
Organizations for Emergency Management
After an accident, the requirements for actions at the higher levels of management typi-
cally will change from strategical planning to tactical decision making. In order to control 
this shift to unfamiliar work conditions, special organizations are typically planned and 
normative emergency procedures are prescribed. Such measures are also intended to co-
ordinate the co-operation between operations management and outside agencies and sup-
port systems. The essence of the discussion of organizational learning is that the actual, 
effective organization evolve from the formal organization through work. It can therefore 
be expected that reliance on the normal work organization through also periods of emer-
gencies will be better than establishment of a special organization controlled (in a feed-
forward mode) by pre-planned procedures (Dynes, 1985).
Decision Support Systems
The task domain of emergency management has an unstructured nature and does not exist 
until an accident has happened. Furthermore, two different parts of the domain can be 
identified. One represents information about the potential source of accidents, i.e., infor-
mation that can be supplied from design, operation, and risk analysis of the system in 
question.
Another domain represents the properties of resources available for emergency control 
after the accident has been initiated, i.e., services such as fire brigades, hospitals, trans-
port facilities, etc. together with geographic and demographic information from the 
neighborhood. The information retrieval aspect of the decision task appears to be very 
important for emergency management. Large amount of information about very different 
aspects such as geographical features, meteorological data, road conditions and traffic 
data, physical and chemical properties of plants and substances, resources of medical 
centers, may be needed for advice by an accident manager. This information will be sup-
plied by many different sources and, typically, not in formats suited for a stressed deci-
sion maker needing procedural advice on short notice. Database formats and retrieval 
tools therefore become central issues of decision support system design.
COMMUNICATION OF RISK CONCEPTS TO DECISION MAKERS
In addition to the problems caused for risk managers by the lack of explicit formulation 
and presentation of the assumptions implied in risk analysis, the very nature of analyses 
of causal chains makes it difficult the communicate results of risk analyses to non-techni-
cal people such as managers and decision makers.
Two kinds of description are used in engineering analysis. One is based on the physical 
sciences and represents the properties of system in terms of quantitative relations among 
measured variables. This representation is possible for relationships which can be 
considered 'practically isolated' from the complexity of the real world. The quantitative 
representation is particularly well suited for the analysis of optimal conditions and  theo-
retical limits of physical processes in a technical system which, by its very design, care-
fully separates physical processes from the complexity of the outside world.
In accident analysis, however, technical systems can no longer be considered as having 
'practically isolated' functions, well contained by system boundaries. Accidents happen 
when system boundaries break down. In this case, the preconditions for relational, math-
ematical analysis of system function also break down and formal methods are replaced by 
analyses of causal chains of events. Causal analysis depends on a description of the be-
havior of a system in terms of objects which interact in events. This kind of description is
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basically different from the quantitative, functionally relationship between measured vari-
ables expressed in mathematical equations. 
It is very important o realize that causal analysis is useful for this purpose because it de-
pends on the identification of objects and events which cannot be objectively defined. The 
behavior of the complex, real world is a continuous, dynamic flow which can only be ex-
plained in causal terms after decomposition into discrete events. Events and objects are 
formed from a categorization of human observations and experiences. Perception of oc-
currences as events in causal connection is not based on categories which are defined by 
lists of objective attributes but on categories which are identified by typical examples, by 
prototypes. This is the case for objects as well as for events. Everybody knows perfectly 
well  what  'a cup' is. To define it objectively by a list of attributes that separates cups from 
jars, vases and bowls is no trivial problem and has been met in many attempts to design 
computer programs for picture analysis. The problem is, that to be 'a cup' is not an 
feature of the isolated object but depends on the context of human experience and needs. 
The identification of events in the same way depends on the relationship in which they 
appear in a causal statement. 
An example: "the short-circuit caused the fire in the house." This statement in fact only 
interrelates the two prototypes: the kind of short-circuit hat can cause fire in that kind of 
house. The explanation that the short-circuit caused a fire may be immediately accepted by 
an audience from a region where open wiring and wooden houses are commonplace, 
though not in a region where brick houses are the more usual kind. If not accepted, search 
for more information is necessary. Short-circuits normally blow fuses, therefore more 
analysis of the conditions present in the electric circuit is necessary; together with more 
information on the path of the fire from the wiring to the house. A path of unusually 
flammable material was probably present. In addition, an explanation of the short-circuit -
its cause - may be needed. The explanation depends on a decomposition and search for 
unusual conditions and events. The normal and usual conditions will be taken for granted 
being implicit in the intuitive frame of reference. In causal explanations, the level of de-
composition needed to make it understood and accepted epend entirely on the intuitive 
background of the intended audience. 
Therefore, if a causal statement is not accepted, formal logical analysis and deduction will 
not help, instead further search and decomposition are necessary until a level is found 
where the prototypes and relations match intuition. In effect, without special precautions, 
causal explanations are only suited to communicate among individuals who share proto-
typical definitions of objects and events because they have similar experience and, there-
fore, common intuition. If this is not the case, it will be easy to give counter-examples 
which can not easily be falsified. 
Since no two accidents will be identical and because it is impossible to analyze all possible 
causes separately, accident analysis depends on categories of causes, events, and conse-
quences. Technical systems are particularly well suited for analysis in terms of causal 
chains due to their well structured and generally stable anatomy which will guide the 
course of events. This is the basis for the rather well-defined completeness of hazard 
identification methods like HAZOP which will cover all causal paths in the pipe-and-in-
strumentation diagram. 
It is much more difficult to take the human influence on accidents into account. Objects, 
then, include mental concepts, events include decisions and actions, and the course of 
events will depend on human communication and mobility. In this case, great care is 
necessary for satisfactory documentation of the context in which the causal texture is 
identified and the paths selected, together with the stop-rules used for termination of the 
search. It is very difficult to state explicitly the completeness of a causal analysis including 
human activities.
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The defence-in-depth design philosophy also creates problems for the communication of 
causal analysis to groups with different experience and background. In a system designed 
according to this philosophy, many errors and faults made by the operating staff and 
maintenance personnel do not directly reveal themselves by functional response from the 
system. Adaptation to task requirements which are very reasonable in the immediate con-
text can therefore violate safety features without visible effect for the actor. It is easy, after 
the fact, to identify unacceptable violations of a design-in-depth design concept. Seen 
separately and in the situation, however, the violations can be reasonable and, in fact, 
necessary for the flow of work. What should be included in the management risk analysis 
is the possible coincidence, not only the individual act. Risk management, herefore, de-
pends on an overview of the causal structure of major risks, not only on the monitoring of 
the individual work situations.
In this kind of system, it is mandatory not only that the causal structure underlying the 
designers' analyses are made explicit but also that it is understood and accepted by the 
operating staff and management which typically will have a very different experience and 
intuition than designers. The dependence of causal analysis on shared prototypes and 
frame of reference and the related problem of communication between different profes-
sions is now becoming an important problem for practical risk management in hazardous 
industries.
CONCLUSION
The basic conclusion is that a number of important safety issues are related to the proper-
ties of the integrated system involved in control of safety. Most of these problems require 
an inter-disciplinary co-operation between basic research in different academic disciplines 
and field studies in different application domains. Typically, such cross disciplinary 
studies are more difficult to have funded and organized than separate studies within an 
accepted professional paradigm because of the teaching obligations of university faculties 
and the similarly focused interest of research councils. For improvement of the safety of 
modern, large-scale systems, it is mandatory that safety is considered a control problem 
and that research is approached from an integrated systems point of view.
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